During the past two decades, considerable attention has been focused on the earnings gap between men and women. Early research attempted to explain this gap as a function of individual differences in human capital characteristics (see Milkovich, 1980) . Individual earnings of men and women were regressed on such variables as education and work experience to determine how much of the pay differential could be attributed to gender differences in human capital acquisition. The unexplained part of the differential, or residual, was then attributed to "discrimination."
Unfortunately, most of these early studies used only crude measures (if any) of the different jobs held by men and women. However, as individual earnings equations began to incorporate better measures of the jobs held by men and women (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1987; Rosenbaum, 1985) , they were able to explain a significantly larger proportion of the earnings gap.
It has now become clear that the major source of the earnings gap is not differential compensation for men and women doing the same work, but rather the segregation of men and women into different jobs that are paid differently (Treiman & Hartmann, 1981) . Thus, the question arises as to whether the different tasks that typify "men's work" and "women's work" are compensated in a way that represents equal pay for equal contribution or value added.
Consequently, recent research has focused more directly on the determinants of compensation for jobs, rather than for individuals.
For example, researchers have considered the extent to which job analysis and job evaluation procedures might lead to differential evaluations of the "worth" of male-dominated versus female-dominated jobs.
In particular, the judgments of job analysts and job evaluators have been scrutinized for evidence of cognitive or evaluative biases that might lead to undervaluation of female-dominated work (e.g., Arvey, 1986) .
studies of this type seek to determine whether, holding other factors constant, the gender composition of jobs influences perceptions of job worth as assessed via job evaluation. Although these studies stop short of examining job~decisions, they examine one of its common inputs: job evaluation results (Belcher, 1974; Milkovich & Newman, 1987; Treiman & Hartmann, 1981) .
Findings from this research are decidedly mixed. Several studies have found little evidence that gender composition influences job evaluation outcomes. For example, Schwab and Grams (1985) found that sex composition, manipulated via proportions of male or female incumbents embedded in a job description, had no effect on either absolute or relative (to two other jobs) job evaluation ratings in a sample of 103 compensation professionals.
Similar results were found for a college student sample (Grams & Schwab, 1985) , with the single exception that gender composition appeared to affect ratings on the compensable factor "job complexity". Both studies did find, however, that information about current market wages had a substantial impact on the evaluation points assigned.
These studies led Grams and Schwab (1985) to conclude that there is little evidence of direct gender bias in job evaluation. Howeve:r, the possibility of "indirect" bias via knowledge of differential market pay for men's and women's work did receive support. Arvey, Passino and Lounsbury (1977) found that sex of the job incumbent (as manipulated by photographs and voices of alleged "incumbents") had no effect on job analysis results using the Position Analysis Questionnaire (PAQ). However, as Grams and Schwab (1985) note, it is unclear whether subjects responded to tne jobs per se or to the individuals performing them. Doverspike and Barrett (1984) On the other hand, Mahoney and Blake (1979 & 1987) reported that the perceived femininity of 20 well-known occupations accounted for a significant proportion of variance in assigned salaries, controlling for the effects of perceived job requirements. However, the authors acknowledge two potential difficulties with their results (see also Grams & Schwab, 1985 anchors, and factor weights).
Although further job evaluation research is surely to be encouraged, it must nevertheless be remembered that job evaluation is only one of many factors that determine job pay (e.g., Schwab, 1980 Schwab, & 1985 . A review of basic compensation literature reveals that job pay is based on some combination of past pay relationships, market surveys, collective bargaining, individual negotiation, supply and demand characteristics, compensation strategies, and job evaluation (e.g., Belcher, 1974; Milkovich & Newman, 1987; Patten, 1977) . Indeed, some argue that job evaluation serves primarily to "capture" or model these other factors, particularly market wages (e.g., Fox, 1962; Livernash, 1957; McCormick, 1981; Schwab, 1980) . Moreover, although job evaluation is a common practice in large organizations, its use is by no means universal (Mahoney, Rosen & Rynes, 1984) . (Levine, 1987) .
Even more compelling are recent studies suggesting that the possession of information about current pay rates may influence job evaluation outcomes (e.g., Grams & Schwab, 1985; Mount & Ellis, 1987; Schwab & Grams, 1985) .
To the extent that these results generalize, it would appear that current pay can have both a direct effect (via market surveys) and an indirect effect (via assigned job evaluation points) on job pay. In light of previous recommendations that job evaluation committees include equivalent numbers of men and women (e.g., Treiman & Hartmann, 1981) , the study also examines the impact of rater sex on pay assignments.
Additional support for examining this variable comes from research suggesting that sex may have an impact on perceptions of appropriate pecuniary rewards (e.g., Huber, 1988; Major & Konar, 1984) .
It should be noted that not all studies have found rater sex effects, however (e.g., Grams & Schwab, 1985; Mahoney & Blake, 1987) .
The study incorporates a number of other previously recommended featureã s well (e.g., Arvey, 1986; McArthur, 1985; Hartmann, 1985) . For example, subjects are professional compensation administrators rather than convenience samples of inexperienced college students. Moreover, these administrators are drawn from a wide variety of public and private sector organizations.
Because surprisingly large pay differentials exist across organizations (e.g., Dunlop, 1957; Hay Group, Inc., 1984; Treiman & Hartmann, 1981) , it is important that pay research include subjects from a broad range of organizations.
The present study also disentangles the effects of market wages and job evaluation points on pay determination. This was accomplished by creating orthogonal job evaluation and market rate manipulations. In contrast, analogous field research has been hampered by high intercorrelations (typically .6 to .8) between salaries and job evaluation points (see Remick, 1981) , which impede the ability to unambiguously attribute pay differentials to specific sources (Rynes, Schwab & Heneman, 1983) .
Finally, the job data are based on a real-world comparable worth study (State of Washington) that has attracted considerable attention in the academic, legal and popular presses (Remick, 1981; Ehrenberg & Smith, 1987;  State of Washington v. AFSCME, 1985; Treiman & Hartman, 1981) .
In line with the bulk of previous research regarding job evaluation and job pay determinants (e.g., Arvey et al., 1977; Grams & Schwab, 1985; Johnson & Ash, 1986; Schwab & Grams, 1985) , no differences in pay assignments are expected on the basis of either job gender or rater sex. On the other hand, it is expected that assigned pay rates will exhibit significant relationships with all three quantitative measures of "worth" (current pay, market rate, job evaluation points).
Although it is not the primary focus of the present research, we further predict that market variables (current pay and market rate) will explain more variance in assigned pay than will job evaluation points. The average age of respondents was 38, average time in current organization was 5.3 years, and average total compensation experience was 8.6 years.
Respondents
were virtually identical to the original sample in terms of sex composition; however, a higher proportion of respondents than nonrespondents were from the public sector (13% v. 6%).
Design and Procedures
In order to examine whether the same "rules" are used in determining pay for male-versus female-dominated jobs, each subject received a questionnaire containing one of two job sets: either predominantly female or predominantly male. Jobs in each set had previously been identified as at least 70% female-dominated, or 70% male-dominated, by the State of Washington comparable worth study (Remick, 1981) . Across the two sets, all quantitative data (current pay, market rate, job evaluation points) were identically matched and thereby held constant.
To insure that the quantitative information would be equally credible in both the male-and female-dominated job sets, each "male" job was matched with a "female" job on the basis of actual pay rates in the state of Washington study (e.g., Remick, 1981; Ehrenberg & Smith, 1987 Next, market survey and job evaluation manipulations were created and then crossed to produce an orthogonal 3 x 3 matrix. This was accomplished in several steps. First, three levels of market rates were defined: 6% below current rate, no change from current rate (although rates were actually manipulated +j-1% or 2% to avoid identical figures for market rate and current pay), and 6% above current rate. Then, three of the job pairs were (randomly) assigned market rates that were 6% below their current rates, three had market rates 1% or 2% below or above current rate, and three had rates 6% above.
Note that each of the market rates produced by this procedure is uniquely linked to a single job pair, as the nine market rates are derived from the nine original salary figures.
The job evaluation manipulation was similarly constructed, but in two steps. First, baseline job evaluation points were created by multiplying the current pay rate by a factor of .4. This created a set of job evaluation scores that were precisely co-linear with current rates, but on a different scale to avoid subject detection of the manipulation. Then, job evaluation levels were created in an identical manner to the market rate manipulation:
6% lower than baseline, no change, and 6% higher than the job evaluation base. Finally, each of these three manipulation levels was randomly assigned to three jobs, in such a way as to create the 3 x 3 orthogonal design reflected in the last two columns of Table 1 .
Insert Their task was to assign a new pay midpoint to each of the 9 jobs.
In assigning new pay rates, subjects were instructed to use the same criteria they would use in their own organizations. Also, it should be kept in mind that we did not want sex composition to be a blatantly salient factor to experimental subjects, as we wished to avoid flagging the comparable worth issue. Rather, our intention was to see whether subtle gender-based differences emerge even when decision maker attention is being focused only on current pay, job evaluation, and market surveys.
Finally, it was possible to perform a number of empirical tests to determine whether job pairs with weaker gender-identification (e.g., those
involving the editor or administrative services manager) yielded different pay patterns from those with stronger gender identification (e.g., those
involving the secretary or nurse). These are elaborated in the third and fourth analyses below.
Analyses
The principal research objective was to determine whether job gender had an independent influence on the assignment of new pay rates. A secondary objective was to determine the relative effect sizes of market versus job evaluation information on pay assignments. In addition, there was interest in determining whether rater sex or order of information presentation (market first vs. job evaluation first) influenced pay assignments. These questions were examined via four analyses, summarized in Table 2 .
Insert That is, rather than examining the differences between current and new rates, the regressions looked at the new pay rate as a function of the current rate, in conjunction with the previous independent variables (i.e., market rate, job evaluation points, job gender, order, and rater sex).
In the third analysis, data from all subjects were combined in a betweensubjects analysis based on 3654 total observations (406 subjects, 9 observations each).
To provide results in a format comparable to that from the ANOVAs, both market rate and job evaluation manipulations were dummy coded (one variable to reflect "up 6%11, one to reflect "down 6%", with the "no change" conditions serving as the omitted categories).
Because each subject provides nine observations, this analysis poses a potential problem in terms of correlated error terms. 
Results
Because responses were not exactly proportional to the total surveys mailed in terms of experimental conditions (i.e., male vs. female job set; market rate presented first vs. job evaluation first), slightly unequal cell sizes were obtained across the four conditions. However, these differences were very small. Furthermore, correlational analysis based on contrast coding revealed negligible relationships among the three between-subjects factors (r = .07 between job gender and rater sex, .03 between job gender and order, and -.03 between order and sex.)
Consequently, all responses were retained for subsequent analyses.
Results of the first two analyses (analysis of variance on raw difference scores and percent change scores) are shown in Table 3 . None of the between-subjects factors (job gender, order, rater sex) or their interactions were significant in either analysis. Thus, as hypothesized, sources of variance other than those signalling job worth do not appear to have contributed to pay adjustments in any systematic fashion.
Insert Table 3 About Here
As hypothesized, within-subject analyses revealed significant main effects for both the market rate and job evaluation manipulations.
Also consistent with our predictions, the size of the market effect was substantially larger than the job evaluation effect. For example, in Analysis 1, the squared canonical correlation for the market manipulation (analogous to omega squared for a between-subjects factor) was .59, as opposed to .15 for the job evaluation manipulation.
In addition, the market rate x job evaluation interaction was significant in both analyses. Examination of cell means suggested that the nonlinear effect was primarily concentrated in the job pair where both the market rate and job evaluation points were 6% higher than baseline (secretary II and security guard). This is illustrated in Table 4 , which gives cell means for Analysis 1.
Insert (The other variables --current pay, market rate, and job evaluation points --are constants in these analyses).
Of the 63 possible effects (9 equations, 7 effects each), only three significant effects were found: a rater sex effect for Job Pair 7, a job gender x rater sex interaction for Job Pair 6, and a job gender x rater sex x order effect for Job Pair 4. Given that these were significant only at p < .05, this is the, number of effects that would be expected by chance alone.
Also, keep in mind that in no equation was the main effect for job gender significant. Therefore, as in preceding analyses, there is no evidence of of differential pay assignment patterns for job pairs with more strongly perceived gender-typing on the female jobs.
Discussion
No matter how the data are analyzed, job gender does not appear to have systematically affected pay assignments. Ra~her, our subjects appear to have based their pay decisions on the relevant quantitative data reflecting job "worth": current pay, market survey rates and job evaluation points.
In this way, our results are similar to those of Grams and Schwab (1985) , Schwab and Grams (1985) , and Johnson and Ash (1986), who also found no evidence of differential decision rules for jobs with varying gender patterns.
In contrast to the only other available study to simultaneously examine the effects of job evaluation and market surveys on job pay (Doverspike et al., 1987) , present results suggest that market rates are stronger determinants of job pay than are job evaluation points. As such, we are reasonably confident that our results reflect the true relative contribution of these factors to subjects' job pay decisions, at least for these eighteen jobs.
In any event, the large impact of market rates on job pay in this stndy reinforces the need to expand future job pay research beyond studies of job evaluation alone.
Although the absence of significant effects for job gender is encouraging, it should be recognized that the possibility of "indirect" discr~ination still exists (e.g., Schwab & Grams, 1985) .
That is, to the extent that either market surveyor job evaluation results themselves reflect previous discrimination and/or cognitive bias, our results suggest that decisions about job pay are likely to incorporate these biases.
This reinforces the need for additional research into the various inputs into pay decisions, such as job evaluation (see Arvey, 1986 ) and market surveys (Rynes & Milkovich, 1986) .
We hesitate to place too much emphasis on the few significant interactions in our study, as the number of effects is only slightly greater than would be expected by chance alone. Still, we conjecture that most of our interactions reflect idiosyncratic reactions to particular job pairs.
For example, three of the four significant interactions involve a nonadditive relationship between market rates and job evaluation points.
This interaction, in turn, appears to be concentrated in a single job pair: secretary II and security guard. Specifically, subjects did not appear to
give the full pay increment that would be predicted by the +6% (market), +6% (job evaluation) combination.
We believe it is more likely that this reflects the particular content of these two jobs, rather than any general tendency to underreward when both pieces of information suggest a job is underpaid. still, the question is an empirical one that should be examined in future research.
Again, although we do not wish to make too much of our interactions, there is at least a hint of potential pay bias against jobs with a heavy physical content. Specifically, in two of the three-way interactions, jobs of a physical nature (i.e., equipment mechanic, maintenance mechanic, security guard, custodian) were given less pay than their "office" counterparts (editor, interviewer, secretary, clerk typist). Thus, future research might examine job "physicality", in combination with gender composition, to determine whether either, or both, contributes to differential reward policies.
Of course, to the extent that non-office biases (or any others) exist, additional research would be necessary to determine the underlying causes.
For example, it may be that white collar staff administrators undervalue any work that does not take place in office settings. Alternatively, they may perceive physical laborers as less marketable in today's service economy, and thus feel less pressure to compensate them generously.
We believe the present research extends previous knowledge in a number of ways. First, it strongly suggests that factors other than job evaluation (e.g., current payor market rates) dominate decisions about job pay.
Moreover, it does so in a carefully constructed experiment designed to facilitate the clear attribution of differences in job pay to specific sources. As such, present results reinforce recent trends in the literature to examine determinants of job pay other than job evaluation (e.g., market surveys, labor market conditions).
Second, the gender manipulation is subtle, relative to much previous research. Subjects were not asked to explicitly contrast male-or femaledominated jobs, nor were they provided with explicit gender composition information.
Although some might argue that our manipulation was too subtle, we believe this to be a less significant problem than gender obtrusiveness in an era of heightened sensitivity to comparable worth. Moreover, many of the biases discussed in the job evaluation literature are indeed very subtle, and hypothesized to operate with only minimal gender cues (see Arvey, 1986; McArthur, 1985 Additionally, we used actual compensation administrators rather than students (in contrast to Doverspike, et al., 1987; Grams & Schwab, 1985; and Mahoney & Blake, 1987 This is unquestionably true. However, we believe that matching on actual pay rates was a better choice in terms of producing a credible experimental task for respondents.
Our logic follows from the fact that pay rates are based on a common metric (money) that is widely understood across a wide variety of settings.
In contrast, job evaluation systems have unique compensable factors, factor weights, and point totals, such that any given system produces a somewhat idiosyncratic point total for any given job. Comparable worth studies have routinely revealed disparities in assessed "worth" for gender-dominated jobs, depending on whether worth is measured in terms of current payor job evaluation points. Thus, it was feared that matching on the basis of job evaluation points would yield unrealistic market rate manipulations for at least some of the jobs. These in turn would be more likely to be detected by compensation administrators than would deviations in job evaluation points,
given the greater generality of monetary (versus job evaluation) metrics.
Nevertheless, future studies matching jobs on evaluation points rather than current pay would be highly desirable. .88 .11 * Significant at p < .01
